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Introduction 
 
Insolvency laws can scarcely have been more high profile than in recent years.  
The liquidation of Thomas Cook, the administration of the Monarch airline and 
those of many high street chains such as Mothercare, as well as CVAs and 
contractual restructurings of many other high street chains have meant that once-
obscure terms of insolvency law are now gaining familiarity among the public.1  
This lexicon will inevitably be expanded if the reform proposals contained in the 
document published in a Consultation Response document during the August 
Bank Holiday in 20182 by the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial 
Strategy become law, since these proposals offer to managers of struggling 
companies the prospect of a restructuring moratorium and an improved 
framework for reaching an agreement with creditors.3 This paper will have its 
focus the potential impact of these proposed reforms on the power dynamic in 
insolvencies.  There is much more that a paper examining the shifting balance of 
power could examine4 but reasons of space mean that the focus of this article will 
be on domestic arrangements and, although the attentions of the media, as well as 
                                                 
1 For a recent discussion of relevant issues related to insolvency we recommend the BBC Radio 
4 podcast, 'The Bottom Line' (24 October 2019) 
<https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/m0009km0>, accessed 25 November 2019. 
2 'Insolvency and Corporate Governance: Government Response' (Department for Business, 
Energy and Industrial Strategy, 26 August 2018) (hereinafter ‘Government Response’). 
3 Reform proposals were also recommended in the Airline Insolvency Review report, prepared 
following the collapse of the Monarch airline and consequent drain on the public purse through 
repatriations.  These proposals potentially add to the range of special insolvency regimes which 
already apply in areas that may have significant public impact, such as utilities, transport 
networks and schools, representing a sharpening of powers to maintain service provision, and 
such a procedure could have enabled a more orderly wind-down of the affairs of Thomas Cook.  
‘Airline Insolvency Review, Final Report’ (March 2019). 
4 There is also the looming shadow of Brexit which stands to make cross-border restructurings 
more difficult in cases involving EU companies, as well as presenting the prospect of 
competition for high value restructurings, in the shape of new models that aim to build on the 
success of schemes of arrangement, prompted both as rivals to the scheme of arrangement and 
in response to EU initiatives to improve restructuring frameworks within the Member States.   
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focus of much of academic discussion has tended to be on larger companies,5 
particular regard will be had to smaller companies, typically owner-managed and 
with small numbers of employees and, in particular, from the perspective of 
whether the reforms will enable these persons to gain greater control in insolvency 
proceedings, as arguably this group has tended to be overlooked for specific 
attention, in spite of their economic importance.6  This importance is emphasised 
by recently passed US reforms aimed at the SME sector as well as attention being 
paid to this area by an UNCITRAL working group,7 which, among other things, 
highlighted a need for simplified and lower cost procedures.   
 
In Part 1 this article will take an initially theoretical approach which will be used 
in Part 2 in an analysis of the actors involved in the balance of power, before 
looking at how this balance has evolved historically.  As will be outlined in Part 
3, the balance has tended to lie with secured creditors, rather than managers, a 
position which has persisted in spite of previous reforms.  Part 4 will outline the 
proposals and evaluate the prospects for the balance to be changed. 
 
Theoretical perspectives 
 
Taking an initially theoretical perspective, it is notable that early normative 
discussions of insolvency law treated the matter as a common pool problem,8 with 
the role for the law being to maximise the size of the pool through means such as 
staying the claims of creditors and providing transaction avoidance rules, as well 
as to provide rules for the distribution of assets among creditors.9  However more 
recently it has been recognised that restructuring requires a different 
                                                 
5 Of particular note is the contribution of Sarah Paterson in ‘Rethinking Corporate Bankruptcy 
in the Twenty-First Century’ (2016) 36 OJLS 697 and ‘The Rise of Covenant-Lite Lending and 
Implications for the UK’s Corporate Insolvency Toolbox’ (2019) 39 OJLS 654. 
6 Scholarship on the insolvencies of small businesses is also lacking in relation to 
unincorporated businesses: see Rebecca Parry, ‘Insolvent Partnerships’ in Jennifer Gant and 
Paul Omar, Elgar Corporate Restructuring Handbook (forthcoming). 
7 Note by the Secretariat, United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, 'Insolvency 
of Micro, Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises, Draft Text on a Simplified Insolvency Regime’ 
(Working Group V, Insolvency Law, 28-31 May 2019) 
<https://undocs.org/en/A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.166>, accessed 25 November 2019.  
8 Notably in Thomas Jackson, The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy Law (Harvard University 
Press, 1986), which provided the first attempt at a normative framework for insolvency law and 
generated much controversy. See e.g. William W Bratton and David A Skeel, 'Bankruptcy's 
New and Old Frontiers' (2017-2018) 166(7) U Pa L Rev 1571 et seq.  
9 The maximisation of returns to creditors is an overriding objectives of corporate insolvency 
law, as identified in Kristin van Zwieten, Goode on Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law 
(5th edn, Sweet and Maxwell, 2019), 2-01 
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theorisation.10  Restructuring potentially represents a nurturing process in the 
management of the company’s assets, rather than treating the assets as a common 
pool to be drained for distribution to creditors, with the role for the law being to 
prevent opportunistic behaviour leading to unfair outcomes in the distribution of 
assets among creditors.  Rather restructuring is properly categorised as addressing 
an anticommons problem,11 enabling company resources to be managed more 
effectively on an ongoing basis for the benefit of a wider range of stakeholders.  
Anticommons issues arise in cases where there are several owners or entitled 
persons, each of whom has the potential to block the usage of others.12 In the 
context of restructuring, the anticommons issue arises in cases where a workout 
approach to a debtor’s financial distress is not possible.  Workouts enable 
financial difficulties to be resolved without recourse to the formal insolvency laws 
and historically creditors have played a significant role in this regard, as 
instigators of remedial action.13  It is when these individualistic contractual 
approaches to the company’s debt problems do not work14 that anticommons 
issues arise, often due to holdouts, and collective restructuring procedures are 
needed in cases where companies are realistically viable.   
 
The role of collective reorganisation laws is therefore, in short, to provide a 
coordinating way forward in circumstances where there is an anticommons 
problem preventing a workout.  The allocation of the power to make key decisions 
in these circumstances arguably can have a bearing on the outcome and this 
allocation therefore requires careful consideration in terms of both legitimacy and 
the means by which the exercise of power can be enabled and appropriately 
restrained.15  Logically, if an ongoing trading approach is to be adopted it is 
                                                 
10 See e.g. Stephan Madaus, ‘Leaving the Shadows of US Bankruptcy Law: A Proposal to 
Divide the Realms of Insolvency and Restructuring Law’ (2018) 19 EBOR 615. 
11 A characterisation first developed by Rolef de Weijs, ‘Harmonisation of European Insolvency 
Law and the Need to Tackle Two Common Problems: Common Pool and Anticommons’ (2012) 
21 Int Insolv Rev 67 and used also as an analytical framework in Michael Schillig, ‘Corporate 
Insolvency Law in the Twenty-First Century: State Imposed or Market Based?’ (2014) 14 JCLS 
1. 
12 The seminal work is Michael A Heller, 'The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the 
Transition from Marx to Markets' (1998) 111 Harvard Law Review 621. 
13 High value and financially complex cases may be conducted through a compromise by 
financial creditors, with smaller creditors being paid in full: Sarah Paterson, ‘Bargaining in 
Financial Restructuring: Market Norms, Legal Rights and Regulatory Standards’, (2014) 14 
JCLS 333. More recently, the growth of covenant-lite lending has meant that early warning 
mechanisms have been sacrificed.  Sarah Paterson, ‘The Rise of Covenant-lite Lending and 
Implications for the UK’s Corporate Insolvency Toolbox’ (2019) 39 OJLS 654. 
14 See Jennifer Payne, ‘Debt Restructuring in the UK’ (2018) 3 ECFR 449, 451, noting how 
changes in the credit market have placed strains on this approach. 
15 Vanessa Finch, ‘The Measures of Insolvency Law’ (1997) 17 Oxford J Legal Stud 227, 245. 
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legitimate to harness the incentives and the skills of those best placed to bring this 
about, which in some instances will be the existing management, subject to 
constraints against perverse incentives.  This harnessing and the constraints to 
which it may be subject will be considered below, in a discussion of the players 
involved. 
 
Allocation of the balance of power 
 
This section considers how the power to determine the management of the 
company and the outcome of reorganisation proceedings can be allocated.  
Reorganisation proceedings that involve ongoing trading arguably consists of 
three main decision-making stages.  That is, at stage one to determine whether 
reorganisation proceedings should be opened, at stage 2 to identify a plan 
providing a way forward, and at stage 3 to approve that plan.  When we consider 
the balance of power in insolvency proceedings there are four major players 
involved in the decisions regarding the management of the commons at these 
stages16 and the company’s future, namely: the debtor (hereinafter also referred to 
as the “company”); its creditors; the court and office holders who, in the UK, are 
licensed insolvency practitioners.  These elements of control are visible in varying 
degrees and stages in insolvency proceedings globally and may be allocated based 
on factors such as incentives and skills and may be subject to safeguarding against 
opportunistic behaviour.  In particular, the power of the party with managerial 
control will be enabled through means such as the protection of the moratorium, 
restrictions on ipso facto clauses, encouragement of further finance and 
frameworks for compromises with creditors but will also be subject to safeguards, 
such as creditor approval, supervision by an insolvency practitioner (in cases of 
debtor-in-possession management), or court oversight. 
 
To give an overview of matters that will be discussed in detail later, in the first 
stage, regarding the opening of proceedings, initially the balance lay with the 
court as the ultimate arbiter of whether administration proceedings should be 
                                                 
16 The position of shareholders of insolvent companies is not considered as their interests in 
insolvency proceedings tend to be limited: West Mercia Safetywear v Dodd (1988) 4 BCC 30, 
Bilta (UK) Ltd v Nazir [2016] AC 1, para 38.  Admittedly not all shareholders are equally 
powerful, however, and it is noted that venture capitalists and distressed debt investors may 
have significant powers of persuasion, as well as mixed motives.  See John Flood, ‘The Vultures 
Fly East: The Creation and Globalisation of the Distressed Debt Market’ in David Nelken (ed), 
Adapting Legal Cultures 257-278, (Hart, 2001), 257-278, and Sarah Paterson, ‘The Paradox of 
Alignment: Agency Problems and Debt Restructuring’ (2016) 17 EBOR 497.  For arguments 
for a greater role for shareholder see Stephan Madaus, Reconsidering the Shareholder's Role in 
Corporate Reorganisations under Insolvency Law (2013) 22 Int Insolv Rev 106.   
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opened.  Subsequently managers gained greater power with the ability to open 
proceedings out of court,17 although even this was subject to notification 
requirements and the ability for a secured creditor to gain control.18  Options for 
managers to formulate plans at the second stage were undermined by the lack of 
a debtor-in-possession option with a moratorium limiting the powers of 
creditors.19 At the basic level the balance at the third stage is between the debtor 
and creditors as some way to resolve the anticommons problem is pursued and 
this could be by way of a compromise of claims or some other arrangement and 
in some instances the court can be given powers to resolve an impasse which, as 
will be explained, is a novel feature of the proposed restructuring plan procedure.   
 
Managers 
 
A point which should be made regarding managers is that there are variations in 
company sizes, managerial competences and in the circumstances that can lead to 
financial difficulties, so that a variety of options for the management of companies 
during insolvency proceedings is arguably needed.20  In some instances the 
management will be struggling and the intervention of an insolvency practitioner 
as an outside manager can be a relief for both the management and the workforce.  
In some instances, the management will be competent and will have a clear idea 
of what needs to be done to resolve the company’s difficulties, which may arise 
due to a temporary and resolvable setback.  Therefore, returning to the matter of 
skills and incentives, although managers will usually have strong incentives to 
achieve a reorganisation, there will be some instances where they have the skills 
to do so and some where they do not. The requirement for an outsider to take 
charge in administration in all cases21 can therefore represent an inefficient 
expense, for reasons explored in more detail later.  By placing greater powers in 
the hands of the existing management the 2018 proposals potentially alter the 
balance, enabling coordinating rules for debt restructuring to be employed by 
these managers to resolve the anticommons problem, as these managers are 
among the persons with the greatest interest in seeing the company continue 
trading.  The potential for ongoing generation of value from the assets of the 
                                                 
17 Insolvency Act 1986, Sch B1, paras 22-34. 
18 Insolvency Act 1986, Sch B1, paras 26 and 36. 
19 The option of a CVA with a moratorium during the process of reaching agreement was 
inserted into the Insolvency Act 1986 as Sch A1, by the Insolvency Act 2000.  However this 
was not a significantly successful reform, as discussed below. 
20 Other systems, such as in Germany and the People’s Republic of China include this flexibility 
by offering the possibility for practitioner-in-possession proceedings to be converted into 
debtor-in-possession proceedings. 
21 The CVA with a moratorium, which enables managers of small companies to retain 
managerial control, never too off and the reasons for its failure will also be discussed later. 
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company through placing protective tools in the hands of management is therefore 
potentially realised in a greater way than before, although not as cheaply and 
easily as might have been hoped, in particular because of the significant restraints 
which will be outlined later.  Arguably the reform proposals reflect concerns that 
managerial power could be abused for example by the taking of excessively risky 
approaches which carry a risk of further losses to creditors.22  If power is to be 
vested in the company’s management this must therefore be subject to some 
constraints on those individuals as a bulwark against opportunistic behaviour, 
such as providing redress in the event of wrongdoing.   
 
Creditors 
 
A need for collective insolvency and restructuring proceedings arises due to the 
anticommons difficulties of coordinating creditor claims outside of collective 
insolvency proceedings, in part due to the diversity of creditors and potential for 
holdouts. Within the context of formal insolvency laws the position of creditors, 
who tend to fall into different classes, is nuanced. Secured creditors have 
historically played a central role in insolvency proceedings, although their 
position has changed over time, as discussed in more detail in the next part.  
Briefly, the dominance of secured creditors in the handling of distressed 
companies prior to 2002 was underpinned by incentives and skills.  They had 
incentives to take action to recover what they were owed and the skills to identify 
cases where action needed to be taken, as well as the ability to harness the skills 
of specialist professionals through the appointment of administrative receivers as 
their agents. However, it was observed that there could be perverse incentives 
towards liquidation in cases where the creditor was over-secured.23  As the 
insolvency system gained maturity this position changed with the virtual abolition 
of administrative receivership under the Enterprise Act 2002.  However to some 
extent in subsequent years prepacks have operated as quasi receiverships, in cases 
where the outcome is that secured creditors are repaid.24  In addition, some of the 
diagnostic and intensive care roles that banks might previously have offered have 
declined, partly as a result of the ability to offload debt to investors who 
                                                 
22 Described as perverse investment incentives by Michael C Jensen and William H Meckling, 
‘Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure’ (1976) 3 
Journal of Financial Economics 305. 
23 Riz Mokal, ‘Administrative Receivership and Administration – An Analysis’ [2004] Current 
Legal Problems 355. 
24 Kayode Akintola and David Milman, 'The rise, fall and potential for a rebirth of receivership 
in UK corporate law’ (2019 preprint) Journal of Corporate Law Studies DOI: 
10.1080/14735970.2019.1631551. 
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specialised in the distressed market and partly due to more lax monitoring through 
“covenant-lite” lending agreements.25 
 
Consideration of the position of other creditors gives an insight into how 
anticommons problems may prevent a restructuring through a workout, as 
creditors have diverse interests and incentives.  Other creditors include landlords 
who, although holding proprietary interests, have found their positions being 
eroded in more recent years,26 to employees, as well as suppliers of goods and 
services.  Tax authorities present some interesting issues, being both a voluntary 
creditor, who has no discretion as to whether or not to advance credit, but also a 
creditor with highly diversified risk, so a default by one creditor will not have as 
much impact as it would on a creditor with fewer debtors.  A further dimension is 
that tax creditors are likely to be more single-minded than some other creditors, 
with a focus on protecting revenue and potentially less of a regard to reputational 
impact.  There are concerns that a scheduled reintroduction of preferential status 
for Crown debts will impact negatively on the prospects of business rescue.27 
 
In cases where a consensual compromise of creditor claims cannot be agreed, 
giving rise to an anticommons position, formal, collective insolvency proceedings 
can provide a framework to enable agreement to be reached.  Creditors typically 
play a key role at this third stage of the proceedings, using their commercial 
judgment as to whether an acceptable deal has been offered, a role which has 
admittedly been undermined in recent years through the growth of prepacks.  The 
reform proposals will, as will be discussed later, give the courts the power to play 
a greater role at this stage in giving approval to a restructuring plan which 
creditors have rejected, best regarded as a safeguarding role as it applies in limited 
circumstances. 
 
Insolvency practitioners 
 
Hitherto the management of the company during reorganisation processes has 
commonly been placed in the hands of an outsider28 acting in the interests of 
                                                 
25 Sarah Paterson, ‘The Rise of Covenant-lite Lending and Implications for the UK’s Corporate 
Insolvency Toolbox’ (2019) 39 OJLS 654. 
26 Innovate Logistics Ltd (in administration) v Sunberry Properties Ltd [2008] EWCA Civ 1321 
27 Julia Irvine, ‘Javid warned over insolvency debts’ 
<https://economia.icaew.com/news/september-2019/javid-warned-over-insolvency-debts> 
accessed 18 September 2019. 
28 The company voluntary arrangement and the scheme of arrangement being notable 
exceptions but neither procedure automatically brings the protection of a moratorium. 
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creditors.29  This management arrangement is a quid pro quo of moratorium 
protection in administration, arguably a state of affairs which arose for historical 
and path dependent reasons which will be explained later in this paper.  As a 
result, in all existing formal insolvency procedures the assistance of an insolvency 
practitioner is required in some capacity and therein, as noted above, lies what can 
in some cases be an inefficient weaknesses in the process because the insolvency 
practitioner, as an outsider, will need time to acquaint himself with the operations 
of the company first before taking any meaningful action. In a time-sensitive 
process such as a company rescue this may well prove to be counter-productive.  
Nonetheless, it should be added that the intervention of an insolvency practitioner 
can be welcomed in cases where the management are struggling with debt 
management to enable ongoing trading. 
 
Courts 
 
The overall power to control the parties and uphold and interpret the law is vested 
in the court30 and the court can be one of the most important constraints against 
misuse of the insolvency procedures, through controlling access, a position that 
has been relaxed somewhat in recent years with the introduction of out of court 
appointments of administrators. However as a matter of principle judges have 
tended not to interfere with “commercial decisions” taken by insolvency 
practitioners,31 thereby reflecting that in the UK, an insolvency practitioner, who 
in most cases is appointed by charge holders, has many of the key decision making 
roles in insolvencies.   
 
Evolution of the balance of power 
 
                                                 
29 Admittedly the primary objective in administration is to rescue the company as a going 
concern: Insolvency Act 1986, Sch B1, para 3. However, this objective is seldom realisable, 
not least because of the expense of a trading administration. 
30 This paper does not consider in detail the role of other state-level institutions.  Generally, the 
preference is for the state to provide a legislative framework to enable the insolvency to be 
handled in market conditions with the courts providing a backstop.  However, it must be added 
that in rare instances the state will intervene and control the proceedings, notably in cases of 
systemic risk, both in relation to financial institutions and even non-financial ones such as 
airlines and, potentially, universities.  However, the preference is for a minimal state role, where 
possible, in order that recourse to public funds is limited. See e.g. ‘Airline Insolvency Review, 
Final Report’ (March 2019). 
31 BLV Realty Organization Ltd v Batten [2009] EWHC 2994 (Ch) [22]; DKLL v Her Majesty’s 
Revenue and Customs [2007] EWHC 2067 (Ch), [2008] 1 BCLC 112 [10]. Andrew Simmonds 
QC sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High Court said, “…the court places great reliance on the 
expertise and experience of impartial insolvency practitioners…” 
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A brief examination of the history of UK insolvencies will show how the balance 
of power has been shifting; from the time when a floating charge holder, who 
could appoint a receiver, had absolute control of the process, to the time when Sir 
Kenneth Cork’s report32 led to the introduction of two new procedures namely; 
administration, which is mainly controlled by an insolvency practitioner, and the 
CVA, which is supervised by one.33 The August Bank Holiday proposals will 
potentially shift this balance once again. In this next section the history of 
insolvency laws will be briefly considered, highlighting in particular how some 
path dependence initially shaped the development of restructuring laws, giving a 
balance of power that was skewed in favour of secured creditors. 
 
1870-2002 
 
Although formal corporate rescue procedures in the UK can be traced back as far 
as 1870, 34  sophisticated institutions to support formal collective procedures took 
longer to develop.  As a result, a historically significant role was played by banks, 
who provided the bulk of the finance to companies and therefore had incentives 
to monitor the affairs of companies, as well as to participate in consensual 
restructurings according to market norms under the London Approach.35  These 
were collective approaches based on contract rather than on formal insolvency 
procedures.  A predominant feature of contractual approaches is receivership, 
which enables a secured creditor to protect their interests by appointing a receiver 
to collect, protect or receive the property that is the subject of the security.  An 
important variation for the protection of the rights of creditors was administrative 
receivership, which dominated insolvency proceedings particularly in the period 
leading up to the coming into force of the reforms of the Enterprise Act 2002.  As 
previously noted, at that time the allocation of power was logical as floating 
charge holders were possessed with incentives as they had a sufficient interest in 
the company’s property, as well as information and skilled judgement as to 
whether to initiate proceedings and devise a way forward.36  However their 
                                                 
32 Cork Committee, Insolvency Law and Practice: Report of the Review Committee (Cmnd 
8558, 1982). 
33 Insolvency Act 1986, Sch B1, para 14 and Insolvency Act 1986, Sch A1, para 6.  
34 The scheme of arrangement procedure was introduced in England under the Joint Stock 
Companies Arrangement Act 1870 for implementation in relation to companies in winding up.  
Subsequently the law was amended to enable such schemes to be used in relation to solvent 
companies and, indeed, that is the most common usage in the modern context.   
35 John Armour and Simon Deakin, ‘Norms in Private Insolvency: the “London Approach” to 
the Resolution of Financial Distress’ (2001) JCLS 42. 
36 John Armour and Sandra Frisby, ‘Rethinking Receivership’ (2001) 21 OJLS 73It should be 
added that the dominance of receivership is evident historically in countries with advanced 
PARRY and GWAZA: Is the balance of power in UK insolvencies shifting? 
 
incentives were not always geared towards ongoing trading.  Administrative 
receivership was merely a vehicle for the enforcement of the entitlements of the 
floating charge holder and the prospects of rescue for the company would be 
dependent on whether this coincided with the interests of the secured creditor.37  
Administrative receivership was a poor response to an anticommons problem such 
as an insolvency in view this potential for perverse incentives and more collective 
approaches were developed, although path dependency factors meant that there 
was initially little disturbance to the balance of power.   
 
The modern age of formal insolvency laws began with the reforms which led to 
the Insolvency Act 1986, which marked a significant modernisation of the 
insolvency system.  In this process the recommendations of the Cork Committee 
were highly influential.  This Committee reported in 1982, 38 having been 
appointed following the economic turmoil of the 1970s.  The Committee’s report 
advised the provision of “means for the preservation of viable commercial 
enterprises capable of making a useful contribution to the economic life of the 
country”,39 and, as previously noted, it was the recommendations of this 
Committee which led to the enactment of the legislation relating to the company 
voluntary arrangement and the administration order. Both procedures were 
somewhat limited.  The company voluntary arrangement provided a simple 
framework for a company to reach a compromise or arrangement with its creditors 
and to do so while under the control of its existing management but it did not 
initially provide a moratorium.  Administration did enable the company to obtain 
the temporary protection of a moratorium but only while under the control of an 
administrator.  Path dependency arose because administration built upon the 
successes that administrative receivership was having in preserving struggling 
companies. 40  Accordingly it was initially designed to address a power vacuum 
so that an insolvency practitioner could take charge of the company in cases where 
there was no floating charge holder able to appoint an administrative receiver.  
                                                 
insolvency laws and also in countries which have yet to develop effective insolvency laws and 
institutions. 
37 Mokal (n 23). 
38 Cork Committee (n 32). 
39 Ibid. 55, para 198(j)  
40 Mention should also be made of the usage, in large and complex cases involving multiple 
lenders of the London Approach, a coordinated and (largely) consensual. strategy adopted by 
lenders See John A Flood, Robert Abbey, Eleni Skordaki and Paul Aber, The Professional 
Restructuring of Corporate Rescue: Company Voluntary Arrangements and the London 
Approach (ACCA, 1995); Alice Belcher, Corporate Rescue (Sweet and Maxwell, 1997) 117-
122; John Armour and Simon. Deakin, ‘Norms in Private Insolvency: the ‘London Approach’ 
to the Resolution of Financial Distress’ (2001) 1 JCLS 21. 
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Effectively a floating charge holder could block the appointment of an 
administrator and they would routinely do so.41  These reforms did not therefore 
end the dominance of secured creditors in the balance of power and they did not 
lead to significant numbers of companies being rescued, partly due to weaknesses 
in the procedures, including the lack of a moratorium in relation to the company 
voluntary arrangement42 and the expense and time-consuming nature of 
administration. 
 
2002-2019 
 
In the UK there was a notable realignment of the insolvency system following the 
virtual abolition of administrative receivership under the Enterprise Act 2002, 
together with the modifications to administration under that Act, which reduced 
the influence of secured creditors and emphasised the collective interests of 
creditors, as well as making improvements to administration in effort to boost the 
rescue culture.  The phenomenon of a rescue culture, although first legislatively 
addressed under the Insolvency Act 1986, had been slow to establish and was not 
fully realised under the 1986 Act, as first enacted, largely due to the dominance 
of administrative receiverships. It was considered that greater success in saving 
companies was evident in the US, which had reformed its bankruptcy laws in 
1978, which marked a significant shifting of the balance of power in favour of 
debtors, although there has been further shifting since. The US Chapter 11 
developed as a model based on debtor-in-possession control, supported by 
specialist courts, in contrast to the practitioner-in-possession model of 
administration. A couple of points must be noted however.  Chapter 11 represents 
only a small proportion of insolvency cases in the US, although large companies 
will tend to restructure using this procedure and recent reforms will introduce a 
streamlined variation for the benefit of small businesses.43  It is also notable that 
the way in which Chapter 11 cases often proceed has changed. Creditors have 
been able to gain the upper hand through the attachment of conditions to post-
                                                 
41 Insolvency Act 1986, s 9 (as originally enacted).  A preference for the appointment of an 
administrative receiver rather than an administrator was noted in Hamish Anderson, ‘Seismic 
Change in the UK’ (2002) 21 International Financial Law Review 41. 
42 This changed under the IA 2000 with the introduction of a CVA with moratorium.  However, 
this procedure remained fairly under-used, perhaps because informal restructuring has been 
successful in enabling debtors to reach agreement with their creditors but also perhaps because 
insolvency practitioners may favour administration and prepacks in view of the greater role that 
they have in these procedures. 
43 Small Business Reorganization Act of 2019 inserting into Chapter 11 a new Subchapter V 
on small business debtor reorganisations. 
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commencement finance44 and section 363 sales are often used to achieve a quick 
business sale, rather than the period of trading envisaged in Chapter 11.45  The 
balance of power has therefore swung back in the direction of creditors. 
 
The lack in the UK of a vehicle for continued trading by existing management 
while under the protection of a moratorium led to a variation of administration 
which had not been anticipated in the legislation, namely the prepack,46 which in 
part developed in response to the expense of the sort of trading administration 
envisaged under the 1986 Act, a trend that has also been evident in the rise in s 
363 sales in the US, as noted.47 As a result, a different sort of rescue culture, that 
of business rescue, dominated, rather than culture of corporate rescue, leading to 
creditor dissatisfaction. This trend has been discussed in detail in the literature48 
and is not the main focus of this paper.  However, it gives rise to a key question, 
which is whether the proposed reforms will facilitate ongoing trading in a way 
that the rise of prepacks indicates that administration has failed to do. 
 
2018 Reform Proposals 
 
A culture of business rescue rather than corporate rescue was therefore the 
environment in which the Government Response reforms were announced.49  As 
noted in the introduction, these August 2018 reform proposals stand to alter the 
                                                 
44 David A Skeel, 'Creditors' Ball: The New New Corporate Governance in Chapter 11' (2003) 
152 U Pa L Rev 917. 
45 Douglas G Baird and Robert K Rasmussen, 'The End of Bankruptcy' (2002) 55 Stan L Rev 
751. 
46 John Armour, Audrey Hsu & Adrian Walters, ‘The costs and benefits of secured creditor 
control in bankruptcy: evidence from the UK’ (2012) 8 Review of Law & Economics 101. 
47 Baird and Rasmussen (n 45). 
48 Teresa Graham, ‘Graham Review into Pre-pack Administration’ 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/graham-review-into-pre-pack-administration>, 
accessed 25 November 2019; Kristin van Zwieten, Goode on Principles of Corporate 
Insolvency Law 5th edn (Sweet and Maxwell, 2019), 11-38; Vanessa Finch and David Milman, 
Corporate Insolvency Law Perspectives and Principles (3rd edn, Cambridge University Press, 
2017), Ch 10. 
49 Government Response (n 2) is quite a wide-ranging document in terms of the efforts that it 
made to address some of the underlying corporate governance deficiencies which were exposed 
in the infamous collapses of BhS and Carillion. The document also proposes specific measures 
which the government intends to further consider in relation to tackling transparency and 
accountability of those dealing with complex groups of companies and the payment of 
dividends by companies facing financial hardships.  In relation to governance more generally 
there were efforts to strengthen shareholder stewardship and to improve boardroom 
effectiveness.   
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balance, with firstly the introduction of a self-standing moratorium framed on 
similar lines to the administration moratorium50 but importantly this will be a 
debtor-in-possession pre-insolvency process under the supervision of an 
insolvency practitioner referred to as a monitor.51 Secondly, the proposed reforms 
will enable anticommons debt problems to be addressed through a restructuring 
plan, which offers some advantages over the scheme of arrangement, a non-
insolvency procedure which is often used for this purpose, and thirdly, restrictions 
will be introduced to prohibit the use of ipso facto clauses, which are clauses that 
allow for contractual termination in the event of one party entering formal 
insolvency.  These reforms potentially offer the prospect of a revived rescue 
culture, with greater powers for company managers, although these powers are 
inevitably tempered by constraints.  As a result, there is a danger that the form in 
which these procedures are presented may make them unsuitable for small 
businesses.  This paper now turns to examine the proposed reforms to the UK 
insolvency framework and how they reflect a shifting of the balance of power at 
the three stages of restructuring, opening, formulating and agreeing, so as to 
encourage more company rescues.  
 
Moratorium 
 
Since the advent of the Insolvency Act 1986 the moratorium has been an 
important mechanism in UK insolvency framework because it has the effect of 
imposing a freeze on the enforcement of actions against a debtor to enable a way 
forward to be devised and implemented but, as noted, it was only initially 
available in administration and this entailed the appointment of an external 
manager. Later, small companies were offered the option to apply for a 
moratorium in connection with a company voluntary arrangement process.52  
However this moratorium was extremely under-utilised since its inception. An R3 
commissioned report revealed that in 2013 of 514 small or micro companies 
agreeing a CVA only 8 or 1.6 percent used a moratorium53 while a recent 
government analysis of Companies House records established that no more than 
10 percent of small companies proposing a CVA utilised a moratorium.54  The 
                                                 
50 Insolvency Act 1986, Sch B1, paras 42 and 43. 
51 Government Response (n 2) paras 5.65 and 5.59. 
52 Insolvency Act 1986, Sch A1. 
53 Peter Walton, Chris Umfreville & Lezelle Jacobs, ‘Company Voluntary Arrangements: 
Evaluating Success and Failure’ (R3 May 2018), Executive summary < 
https://www.icaew.com/-
/media/corporate/archive/files/technical/insolvency/publications/cvas-evaluating-success-and-
failure.ashx> accessed on 12 September 2019. 
54 Government Response (n 2) para 5.14 and footnote. 
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responses to the government Consultation55 revealed that the very low uptake of 
this moratorium could be attributed to the onerous demands and risks of personal 
liability it imposes on insolvency practitioners and also the restriction of usage to 
small companies.56 Therefore a strong case for the introduction of a simpler, more 
accessible moratorium capable of providing the much needed “breathing space” 
to financially distressed, yet viable, smaller businesses where managers have the 
skills and incentives to achieve the rescue of the company as a going concern.  
The proposed short-term standalone moratorium holds the prospect of 
empowering company directors and managers in this way, offering simplified 
means to enable them to consider their options and also facilitating pre-insolvency 
negotiations with creditors to achieve a debt restructuring and it may therefore 
enable anticommons problems to be addressed.  However, although this procedure 
is likely to be cheaper and simpler for companies than administration, enabling 
the skills and incentives of managers to be harnessed, arguably the safeguards 
which have been attached to this procedure will make it unsuitable for SMEs. 
 
Since this is a facilitative procedure without any indicative outcome the first two 
stages, of opening and formulating, will be discussed below.  It is anticipated that 
the moratorium may be used as a vehicle for the agreement of a restructuring plan 
and that procedure therefore would provide the framework for agreement, 
although this is not the only outcome that could be pursued during the 
moratorium. 
 
Opening 
 
Since the moratorium will impact significantly on the entitlements of creditors to 
enforce their claims against the company it is unsurprising that there are 
safeguards attached to the use of this procedure.  These include conditions for 
eligibility for obtaining a moratorium.  From the perspective of small and medium 
enterprises these ex ante conditions are potentially prohibitively expensive, in 
particular when it is borne in mind that significant ex post sanctions are available 
in cases of abuse and the moratorium will operate for a relatively short period of 
time.57  
                                                 
55 The Insolvency Service, ‘A Review of the Corporate Insolvency Framework: A Consultation 
on the Options for Reform’ (May 2016). 
56 Government Response (n 2) para 5.10. 
57 Where the conditions of eligibility are satisfied, this moratorium will be commenced by filing 
the necessary papers at court in a process resembling the out of court appointment of an 
administrator in accordance with paragraph 22 of Sch. B1 of the Insolvency Act 1986.  Ibid. 
para 5.19. 
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a) Solvency 
 
Unlike in an administration or CVA moratorium, it is a condition of eligibility for 
this proposed free standing moratorium that a debtor must be solvent.58  Although 
this restriction will provide a safeguard for creditors in cases where companies 
have passed the point of no return, hindering the mis-use of this protection by 
directors of insolvent debtors seeking “to kick the can down the road” while also 
compounding creditor losses in the process,59 it arguably reveals an approach with 
some distrust of struggling companies and it may deny protection to companies 
that are facing cash flow difficulties but still viable.   
 
The availability of the proposed moratorium is thereby restricted to companies 
who are facing “relatively minor short-term cash flow issues.”  This requirement 
also guards against strategic use of the moratorium by healthy companies and the 
government therefore proposes that the test for eligibility shall involve an enquiry 
into whether the solvent company seeking the moratorium will become insolvent 
if action is not taken.60 The Government Response calls this the “prospective 
insolvency” test.61 The delicate onus of determining the proper cut-off point 
between prospective insolvency and actual insolvency falls on the company 
directors. This seems like a clarion call for company directors and managers to 
take early corrective measures which may prevent unnecessary company 
collapses and safeguard employment. Clearly the government will be hoping that 
the courts will be able to resolve the tension that seems to exist between the 
requirement that a company must be solvent at the time of filing for this 
moratorium and the fact that a debtor already embroiled in winding-up 
proceedings can still be eligible for this protection.  However, it must also be 
noted that the inclusion of this requirement can potentially put the availability of 
moratorium protection beyond the reach of many small and medium enterprises.  
A contrast may be made with the United States Chapter 11, which contains no 
requirement to prove the solvency,62 or indeed insolvency, of a company which is 
applying for protection, and instead provides a safeguard that the filing can be 
challenged in cases where there is cause to do so, such as if the filing is not made 
in good faith.63  In contrast, an enquiry as to a company’s solvency will add to the 
                                                 
58 Ibid. para 5.28. 
59 Ibid. para 5.28. 
60 Ibid. para 5.29. 
61 Ibid. para 5.29. 
62 A position that has been explained by reference to the inability to restructure debts otherwise 
than consensually outside the context of insolvency proceedings: Madaus, (n 10), 628. 
63 11 USC, s 1112(b). 
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“time, effort and funds”64 required if a moratorium is to be made and it arguably 
would have been preferable if other safeguards, discussed below, had been 
considered sufficient.  
 
b) Prospects of rescue 
 
Another condition of eligibility is that a company must show that there are 
prospects of rescue. Clearly, the nature and extent of the rescue envisaged here 
will need to be clarified when these proposals reach draft legislation otherwise 
this requirement is likely to generate controversy.65 During the Consultation it 
was considered that the test to be applied to assess the prospect of rescue might 
be whether or not there were “reasonable prospects” of agreeing a compromise or 
arrangement with creditors if the moratorium was triggered.66  However, the 
government has resolved to set the bar higher. It proposes that the test will be 
whether on “the balance of probabilities”, rescue will be more likely than not.67 
As a concession the government has rejected stakeholder suggestions that a debtor 
should seek the consent of creditors first before commencing the moratorium. The 
government believes that pre-filing engagements between the debtor and the 
creditors will suffice.68  However concerns may again be presented as to the 
possible time and expense that this condition will add to the application process. 
 
It is also a condition of entry that the company seeking a moratorium must have 
sufficient funds to operate its business, meeting all its current obligations as well 
as those falling due during subsistence of the protection.69 This requirement 
clearly operates as a tool for measuring a debtor’s potential to recover from its 
difficulties and provides a safeguard for both existing and new creditors.  
However, it is again a matter that the company will need to prove and this may 
generate costs which present an obstacle for SMEs. 
 
c) Ineligibility 
                                                 
64 Samuel Bufford ‘The New Chinese Bankruptcy Law: Text and Limited Comparative 
Analysis’ (2007) 16 Norton Journal of Bankruptcy Law and Practice 697, part II(B).  The 
learned former judge was criticising a requirement for a debtor to prove insolvency, rather than 
solvency, however arguably the same issues arise. 
65 Sandra Frisby (2019): ‘Of rights and rescue: a curious confluence?’ (2019, forthcoming) 
JCLS, DOI: 10.1080/14735970.2019.1615165. p 1 <https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rcls20> 
accessed on 12 September 2019. 
66 Government Response (n 2) para 5.31. 
67 Ibid. para 5.31. 
68 Ibid. para 5.31. 
69 Ibid. para 5.33. 
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A company70 shall be ineligible to engage this moratorium if it has entered into 
another moratorium, administration or CVA in the last 12 months.71 Clearly, the 
rationale here is to deter companies from unnecessarily trying to postpone an 
inevitable insolvency by abusing this protection. However, a company subject to 
a winding-up petition in the last 12 months which did not result in a winding-up 
order shall not be ineligible; nor shall a company subject to a pending winding-
up petition.72 In the latter scenario the company will have to seek the court’s 
permission to access the moratorium.73  
 
d) Monitor 
 
The supervisory role of the monitor is required right at the onset. Following the 
government Consultation74 it has been agreed that initially the monitor will have 
to be a licenced insolvency practitioner although there is a possibility of a wider 
range of professionals being eligible to hold office in the future.75  The monitor, 
who will have undertaken an assessment of the company beforehand, will have to 
file their consent to act and a confirmation that the eligibility tests and qualifying 
conditions are met.76  To further assuage the concerns of creditors generally it is 
proposed that a monitor will have to send notices to all known creditors and to 
register the company’s entry into the moratorium at Companies House.77  
 
Formulating 
 
This moratorium should last for an initial 28-day period from the day that the 
necessary papers which include the monitor’s consent to act and confirmation of 
eligibility and qualification for entry are filed with the court.78 This moratorium 
is comparatively far shorter than the initial 120 days protection offered by the US 
Chapter 11 moratorium from which these reforms derive their inspiration. Only 
pre-packs, which the Consultation clearly did not contemplate as the desired 
                                                 
70 Companies of all sizes will be eligible except those listed in paragraphs 4A to 4J of Insolvency 
Act 1986, Schedule A1 (those engaged in Capital Markets, Public-Private Partnership projects 
and those in Financial Collateral Arrangements). 
71 Government Response (n 2) para 5.21. 
72 Ibid. para 5.22. 
73 Ibid. para 5.23. 
74 The Insolvency Service (n 55).  
75 Government Response (n 2) para 5.63 
76 Government Response (n 2) para 5.19 
77 Ibid. para 5.19 
78 Ibid. para 5.49. 
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outcome,79 are likely to thrive when a debtor has limited time within which to 
resolve their difficulties, in that instance through a sale of the company’s 
underlying business. Perhaps unsurprisingly therefore, provision for an extension 
of a further 28 days, which is predicated on the monitor’s confirmation of the 
company’s continuing qualification for the protection, is proposed.80 An extension 
beyond the total of 56 days would require the approval of 50 percent of the secured 
creditors by value, and more than 50 percent of unsecured creditors by value but 
where this approval is impracticable the company may apply for an extension 
through the court like in administration.81 
 
A monitor will have the responsibility of sanctioning any asset disposal outside 
of the normal business operations of the company and the granting of new 
security.82 Most notably, in a clear sign of a shift in the balance of power, a 
monitor will not be permitted to consent to actions that undermine the effect of 
the moratorium without the consent of the company like in an administration 
where an administrator may act as they “think” and neither will a creditor be able 
to do likewise without a court’s approval.83 In very unambiguous language the 
Government Response declares that this: “reflects that the moratorium is a debtor-
in-possession process and that the monitor is not running the company.”84   
 
The government proposes that any credit advanced during this moratorium will 
enjoy “super-priority” status over any costs or claims in administration or 
liquidation, including the expenses of such procedures in the event that the rescue 
fails.85 Interestingly, the Government Response contemplates that within this class 
of “super-priority” creditors the “highest priority” will be afforded to suppliers 
who will have been prohibited from triggering termination clauses, as will be 
discussed below.86 While acknowledging the difficulties that this proposal will 
create especially in relation to secured creditors and the future appointments of 
administrators, whose fees will rank lower, the government believes that creating 
an enabling environment for company rescue is well worth the trouble.87 This 
                                                 
79 The Insolvency Service (n 55) para 7.21. “…to ensure that a company applying for a 
moratorium has the prospect of exiting the moratorium or other insolvency procedure as a going 
concern...” 
80 Government Response (n 2) para 5.52. 
81 Ibid. para 5.55. 
82 Ibid. para 5.65. 
83 Ibid. para 5.40.; Insolvency Act 1986, Sch B1 para 43 
84 Ibid. para 5.40. 
85 Ibid. para 5.79. 
86 Ibid. para 5.79. 
87 Ibid. para 5.81. 
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enabling environment indicates a shifting balance of power for those companies 
which are able to make use of the moratorium, as those elements which 
traditionally occupy a strong position in administration proceedings, give way to 
the enhanced position of a debtor in the quest to create a better rescue culture.  
However, as noted, the cost of the moratorium may be prohibitive for many 
SMEs. 
 
Apart from being responsible for assessing the eligibility and qualification of a 
company at commencement of the moratorium, as discussed above, the monitor 
will also be expected to terminate the moratorium immediately, where the 
qualifying conditions cease to be met during its tenure.88 While it is an important 
safeguard for creditors, the proposal to terminate a moratorium based on 
information to be provided by directors in a debtor-controlled rescue operation 
may prove quite challenging.89 When a monitor terminates the moratorium by 
notifying the court, the company and creditors, the creditors will be free once 
again to enforce their rights but the monitor will be immune from claims 
emanating from erroneous termination provided they acted in good faith.90 
However, a monitor is prohibited from taking a subsequent appointment in an 
administration or liquidation involving the same company within 12 months will 
be imposed on a monitor to obviate conflicts of interest91 but they will be 
permitted to act as a supervisor in a CVA.92  
 
Ex ante scrutiny 
 
It is envisioned that creditors will be able to challenge this moratorium at any 
stage during its lifespan on the grounds that the company is ineligible for the 
protection; or that the qualifying conditions are not being met; or that there is 
unfair prejudice to creditors.93 To facilitate these challenges the government 
proposes to take a similar legislative approach to that enabling a creditor to obtain 
the permission of the court to take action that would otherwise be restricted by the 
administration moratorium. However, the first two grounds of these challenges 
may prove unsustainable for an ordinary creditor who may not have access to the 
company’s financial information in the relatively short duration of the 
                                                 
88 Ibid. para 5.65. 
89 Chris Umfreville, ‘A revised moratorium to help business rescue: a review of the latest reform 
proposals’ (2018) 411 Co LN 1, 5. 
90 Ibid. para 5.68. 
91 Ibid. para 5.76. 
92 Ibid. para 5.76. 
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moratorium. Likewise, without a clearer definition of the meaning of “unfair 
prejudice” this ground could also present difficulties to the creditor.94  
 
There is also the possibility that a director can be made liable for wrongful 
trading95 in cases where the company which obtains the moratorium has past the 
point of no return during the tenure of this moratorium.96 Furthermore as a 
deterrent against the abuse of this moratorium by “dishonest or reckless directors” 
the government will consider imposing similar sanctions to those applicable to the 
CVA97 moratorium.98  
 
Ex post scrutiny offers safeguards for creditors as well as potential deterrents 
against abuse of the moratorium procedure.  Since the monitor provides both an 
ex post and an ex ante safeguard, it might be wondered whether the ex ante 
conditions of solvency and prospects of rescue were also necessary, given the 
extra burdens of costs that it has previously been noted that these requirements 
will entail and which may put the moratorium procedure beyond the reach of some 
companies, in particular SMEs, so that the shifting of the balance of power that 
the moratorium potentially brings for managers will only lie in limited directions.  
 
Restructuring plan 
 
Building on the success of the scheme of arrangement, which is technically not 
an insolvency procedure but which has been used to effect successful 
restructurings of large companies, the Government proposes to introduce a new 
flexible procedure into the insolvency framework which will enable a debtor’s 
restructuring plan to be binding against all creditors even those who will have 
voted against it, through the use of a cross-class cram down provision.99 This 
proposal would significantly strengthen the ability of the court to support the 
restructuring efforts of the company in situations where creditor holdouts have 
given rise to an anticommons problem preventing a contractual workout outside 
insolvency law.  However, to prevent the creditors from having an unfair deal 
foisted upon them the proposed cram down would only be imposed upon 
dissentient class of creditors if they will not be worse off than in liquidation as a 
                                                 
94 Sandra Frisby (n 65). 
95 Insolvency Act 1986, s 214. 
96 Government Response (n 2) paras 5.41 and 5.42. 
97 Insolvency Act 1986, Sch A1, para 16. 
98 Government Response (n 2) para 5.44. 
99 Ibid. para 5.114. 
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result of the plan.  Cramdown powers are therefore effectively restricted to cases 
where there is a financially unreasonable aspect to the refusal.  
 
Opening 
 
After extensive deliberations the Government Response proposes that this 
restructuring plan should be a standalone procedure available to companies of all 
sizes with the exception of those involved in specific financial markets and similar 
undertakings,100 like those excluded from the moratorium discussed above.101 
Both solvent and insolvent companies will have access to this procedure and this 
procedure may therefore be regarded as a type of pre-insolvency proceedings. 
Enabling solvent companies with emerging financial difficulties to restructure 
using this procedure is intended to “reduce the stigma and encourage earlier action 
on the part of directors, thereby avoiding value-destructive action and leading to 
better outcomes on the whole for creditors and other stakeholders in a 
company.”102 It may also be noted that companies will not face the evidential task 
of proving solvency as a condition of restructuring, which will help to limit the 
costs of this procedure, although as previously noted that will be a requirement if 
a moratorium is first obtained.  Companies already engaged in an insolvency 
procedure will also be able to propose a restructuring plan in line with existing 
provisions in the framework, through the office holder, since there is no financial 
entry criterion.103 Just like the scheme of arrangement, which it is intended to 
resemble, the implementation of a restructuring plan takes place in stages. 
 
Agreeing 
 
The first stage involves the presentation of the restructuring plan to creditors and 
shareholders and filing the same at court.104 That plan must specify the division 
of the creditors and shareholders into their classes. At the first court hearing a 
court will consider the class composition and any challenges by creditors or 
shareholders before confirming that a vote on the proposal may be conducted on 
a specific date (electronic voting will be encouraged) ahead of a second hearing. 
In this regard the restructuring plan framework will build upon the vast 
jurisprudence built over many years to deal with the issue of class formation for 
voting purposes.105 If no challenges or counter proposals are allowed by the court 
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101 Government Response (n 2) para 5.130 
102 Ibid. para 5.131 
103 Ibid. para 5.132. 
104 Ibid. para 5.135 
105 Ibid. para 5.151. 
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the creditors and shareholders will vote on the plan. The approval threshold has 
been set at 75 percent in value of the creditors in each class which must be 
supported by a majority in number of unconnected creditors. Confirmation of the 
restructuring plan will be done at the second court hearing if the voting threshold 
is achieved but if not the rules applicable to the proposed cross-class cram down 
of dissenting classes of creditors must be complied with first.106 
 
The proposed introduction of a cross-class cram down into this restructuring plan 
is a significant move towards alignment with the US Chapter 11 features. The 
government is very clear that the addition of this tool to the restructuring plan, 
subject to safeguards, is very important for business rescue and that it will ensure 
that the UK can maintain its position as a “leading global restructuring hub.”107 It 
is hoped that cross-class cram down will resolve the problems caused by ransom 
or hold-out creditors giving rise to the anticommons problem discussed above.108 
These can be creditors who sabotage the progress of the restructuring plan by 
demanding better treatment at the expense of other creditors, usually resulting in 
the collapse of the negotiations. The government also hopes that the existence of 
this tool may well incentivise creditors to seek more consensual restructurings 
because a cross-class cram down empowers a court to confirm a plan despite 
opposition by a particular class.109 In the US the safeguard for a cross-class cram 
down is found in the “absolute priority rule” (APR) which provides that the claims 
of a class of creditors must be paid in full before those of a junior class unless the 
senior class consents to a departure from this rule.110 However the UK government 
proposes to apply a different approach. 
 
The court will be permitted to confirm a non-compliant plan if; (a) it is necessary 
to achieve the aims of the restructuring and, (b) it is just and equitable in the 
circumstances. The Government Response suggests that this is a much higher 
threshold where the APR will be applied at the same time allowing enabling the 
court to exercise its absolute discretion to sanction a “workable restructuring 
plan.”111 This residual power is potentially of great benefit to debtors who might 
otherwise be at the mercy of holdout creditors who wield what is effectively a 
deciding vote in their class. Under this two stage test creditors will also have an 
additional safeguard in that at least one class of impaired creditors will be required 
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109 Ibid. para 5.148. 
110 Ibid. para 5.157. 
111 Ibid. paras 5.164 and 165. 
Nottingham Insolvency and Business Law e-Journal 
to have voted in favour of the plan for a court to confirm the cross-class cram 
down. 
 
The Government Response, rather inconclusively, examines the issue of the how 
to value the company’s estate for restructuring purposes after noting the 
controversy surrounding the issue both the US and UK. It is proposed that 
valuation would be based on what the government terms “the next best 
alternative” for creditors if a plan is not agreed.112 The rationale is that the 
valuation must be based on the insolvency proceedings into which the company 
may end up in, if rescue fails; either administration or liquidation,113 effectively 
the approach which has been applied in relation to schemes of arrangement. 
However there is also optimism that this usually contentious issue need not be the 
subject of dispute and that any impasse can be resolved through “dialogue and 
negotiation.”114  
 
However, supposing the issue of valuation has been resolved and the proposed 
two stage test for a non-compliant plan has been applied and at least one class of 
impaired creditors has voted in favour of the restructuring plan a court can confirm 
the cross-class cram down. The effect of confirmation by a court in this case, just 
like in a restructuring plan where the requisite voting thresholds have been 
reached, as discussed above, is that the plan will be binding on all affected parties 
including any dissenters and all previous rights against the company will be 
extinguished and replaced by those contained in the plan.115 Even if the plan was 
to subsequently fail the creditors’ rights would governed under the plan. The 
restructuring plan has no time limits, just like a scheme of arrangement.  
 
Unlike in the moratorium where supervision is required, company directors will 
be able exercise unfettered rights as a debtor-in possession throughout the tenure 
of the restructuring plan. For the first time within the UK, the insolvency 
framework enables company directors of a debtor company to instigate a 
restructuring plan on their own volition at any time,116 potentially causing the 
extinguishment of the pre-existing rights of any class of creditors without their 
consent,117 trigger a cross-class cram down of dissenting classes of creditors118and 
to determine the valuation of their own company estate.119 This procedure 
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therefore offers the prospects of greater powers for struggling companies to reach 
an agreement with their creditors.  This procedure potentially addresses the 
anticommons problem in a way that represents empowerment of managers, with 
the support of the courts, to implement plans for the survival of their companies 
at relatively low cost.  The lack of a “built-in” moratorium is a potential weakness 
but the procedure can be combined with the new moratorium process that was 
previously outlined, although that procedure brings costs that may put it beyond 
the budget of many SMEs. 
 
Termination clauses (Ipso facto clauses) 
 
A further reform proposal in the Government Response relates to what has been 
termed, “helping businesses keep trading through the restructuring process.”120 
The proposal is aimed at tackling the practice by suppliers of triggering 
termination clauses (ipso facto clauses) when a customer enters an insolvency 
procedure, even when invoices are being settled on time. The now defunct 
Woolworths fell victim to this practice when upon its entry into administration 
the record company of the popular musical band Take That halted all van 
deliveries of the group’s latest album to its stores.121 Ransom payments, which are 
instances when suppliers of products or services that are necessary for the survival 
of a debtor demand higher payments to continue supplies during the insolvency 
procedure, are also targeted by the reform.122 Currently suppliers of “essential 
supplies” such as IT and utilities are already required to maintain supplies by law. 
The Consultation considered whether a company or insolvency practitioner 
should be empowered to designate the services to be considered essential to the 
business but instead the government resolved to impose a broader and more far-
reaching solution which will: “prohibit the enforcement of ‘termination clauses’ 
by a supplier in contracts for the supply of goods and services where the clause 
allows a contract to be terminated on the ground that one of the parties to the 
contract has entered formal insolvency.”123  
 
Clearly, this proposal has the potential of being the most controversial of the three 
main reforms proposed in August 2018 because it has the effect of undermining 
commercial contracts and by so doing forcing suppliers of certain goods and 
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121 ‘Band on the run: Take That album caught up in collapse’, The Guardian (London, 29 Nov 
2008) https://www.theguardian.com/business/2008/nov/29/woolworths-take-that-album> 
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services to resort to cash sales which would impact adversely on small 
businesses.124 However, such an assault on a creditor’s contractual rights is 
arguably not without precedence in the UK insolvency framework. In Innovate 
Logistics Ltd (in administration) v Sunberry Properties Ltd125  Mummery J upheld 
the continued occupation of a building in the course of an administration in 
violation of a landlord’s rights and stated that it may be, “necessary for 
administrators to repudiate contracts and breach obligations” to achieve the 
objectives of administration.126 
 
An aggrieved supplier can challenge this prohibition. They would need to seek 
the permission of the court to terminate supplies on the grounds of “undue 
financial hardship.”127 The standard to be applied by the court in determining 
“undue financial hardship” is whether the supplier would be more likely than not 
to enter an insolvency procedure as a consequence of continuing to supply the 
debtor.128 How a supplier is practically expected to establish that its own 
operations will be imperilled by this prohibition, when the government proposes 
that all suppliers within a restructuring plan will enjoy “high priority” under the 
rules, remains to be seen. The government admits that it intends to set the bar for 
challenging the prohibition relatively high so as to discourage “frivolous 
petitions” by suppliers. This proposed reform therefore strengthens the position 
of companies that are dependent on continued supplies but suppliers may feel that 
the balance of power has swung too far against them and suppliers who are SMEs 
may particularly feel the pinch. 
 
Conclusion  
 
A feature of UK insolvency law has been the building of reforms based on what 
has gone before.  The 2018 proposals stand to add to the toolkit of options for 
struggling companies in potentially significant ways, some of which increase the 
powers of company managers to steer their companies out of difficulties.  A 
concern when offering options which alter the balance of power, as these reforms 
potentially do, is whether it is a good fit for the skills of the legal institutions and 
practitioners which have developed.  Some changes in role are notable, with the 
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courts playing a greater role at the agreement stage and practitioners occupying a 
safeguarding, rather than managerial role.  Significant distrust of company 
managers has perhaps been evident in the rescue laws to date, with the emphasis 
in administration on insolvency practitioner control and it is still arguably evident 
in the way in which some of the proposed reforms have been shaped, with 
safeguards designed to prevent the procedures being used for abusive purposes 
making the procedures more costly and more difficult to implement than might 
have been desired of a true alternative to administration.  In particular the 
moratorium is still likely to be on the expensive side for SMEs given the number 
of things that have to be proved by companies seeking a moratorium, as well as 
the cost of the monitor, and arguably this reform does not meet the 
recommendations of the UNCITRAL working group that SMEs should be able to 
benefit from low cost procedures.129  The government, which of course proposed 
these reforms long before the December 2019 election, should be commended for 
intending to take the bold decision to introduce a debtor-in-possession 
moratorium for the first time.  The Government Response document indicated that 
reforms would be made as soon as parliamentary time permits, offering a potential 
recalibration of the balance of power in an attempt to invigorate the rescue culture, 
although more might have been done to tailor the reforms for SMEs. 
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